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COMMENTS
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW - STOCKHOLDERS' REMEDIES FOR CORPORATE INJURY RESULTING FROM ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS: DERIVATIVE ANTITRUST SUIT AND FIDUCIARY DuTY AcTION - The question
of what remedies are available to a stockholder whose corporation
has been injured or is threatened with injury by acts violative of the
federal antitrust laws1 is largely unexplored. The staggering fines
suffered by a number of corporations in the recent electrical industry criminal antitrust convictions2 demonstrate, however, that the
question is both timely and important. Moreover, its answer could
have a great impact both upon the means of protecting corporate
minority rights 3 and upon the means of private enforcement of the
federal antitrust laws.4 The stockholders' derivative suit5 affords
l The most important of these are the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958); the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §~
12-27, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958); and the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958). This comment deals only with problems
raised by stockholders' actions based on violation of the federal antitrust laws. It should
be noted, however, that such actions might also be predicated on the violation of state
antitrust statutes. See, e.g., DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y.S. 912
(1937), aff'd, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1938).
2 Twenty indictments under the Sherman Act were returned, involving most of the
nation's major electrical industry corporations. TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.)
,i 45,060, Cases 1496A, 1498, 1500, 1502, 1504, 1506, 1507, 1517, 1519, 1521, 1523, 1525,
1527, 1529, 1539, 1541, 1548, 1550, 1558, 1566. Convictions were entered and sentences
imposed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on
February 6 and 7, 1961. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1961, p. 16, cols. 4-6. The General Electric
Company, illustratively, was fined a total of $252,500. Ibid. The potential loss, however,
is much higher, since the government and other parties allegedly injured by the illegal
practices have already started to institute treble damage actions against the convicted corporations. E.g., United States v. General Electric Co., TIW>E REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.)
,J 45,061, Case 1596 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
3 "We recognize that defense of a derivative suit [under the federal antitrust laws]
... may be hard and expensive. But no substitute method of minority corporate supervision has yet been developed. . . ." Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194,
198 (2d Cir. 1959) (Clark, J.). See generally Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit- Corporate
and Individual Grievances, 33 YALE L.J. 580 (1924).
4 See generally Note, 66 YALE L.J. 413 (1957); 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 1069 (1952).
5 This comment is directed toward stockholder remedies for injury to the corporation.
The derivative suit treated in the text is the appropriate remedy in this regard. To be
distinguished from the derivative suit is the stockholder's private suit, whereby the stockholder, either individually or as a representative of all stockholders as a class, sues fOI'
injury to himself as a stockholder. See 13 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS §§ 5908, 5911
(perm. ed. rev. vol. 1961). It is sufficient here to note that neither the individual nor
representative stockholders' suit will lie under the federal antitrust laws where predicated
on injury to his corporation. It has been uniformly held that the indirect loss the stockholder suffers from a wrong to the corporation - the reduction in the value of his stock
and potential share in the corporate assets-is not injury to his "business or property"
which would justify a treble damage action under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). Peter v. Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th
Cir. 1953). Nor is it "threatened loss or damage" justifying relief under section 16 of
that act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958). Continental Sec. Co. v. Michigan
Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1926). That the plaintiff stockholder owns all the stock
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two remedies which deal with these two points respectively.6
There are two general types of derivative action. One lies where
the corporation has a right of action against any party, within or
without the corporate structure, but is unable or unwilling to
assert that right.7 This form of derivative suit could be brought
under the federal antitrust laws for the various forms of relief
specified therein against any party, either within or without the
corporation, whose violation of those laws injures the corporation.8
The second type of derivative action lies when any of those persons in control of the corporation act inimically to its interests, in
breach of their :fiduciary duties to the corporation, to hold them
personally liable to it for the injuries resulting therefrom. 9 Such
a derivative suit could be brought against directors or officers of
the corporation to hold them personally liable to it for injuries
it sustains by reason of their having violated or caused the corporation to violate the federal antitrust laws in breach of that
fiduciary duty, or to restrain such violations.10 It is with these two
actions that this comment is concerned.11

I.

STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS UNDER THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS

A.

The Law Prior to 1953

From the time private parties were given the power under the
federal antitrust laws to enjoin the violation of those laws, the
stockholders' derivative suit has apparently been an appropriate
does not change the result. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F.
Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y.), adhered to, 32 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), afj'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir. 1940). See Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1017 (1942); Note, 5 STAN. L. REv. 480 (1953). Of
course, a stockholder can recover personally for any individual loss from an antitrust
violation which also happens to injure his corporation. Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 Fed. 522
(6th Cir. 1897). By hypothesis, individual and representative private suits do not lie to
remedy breaches of fiduciary duty to the corporation discussed in section III of this
comment.

op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 5850-6045.
Freight R.R., 105 U.S. 13 (1881). See 13 FLETCHER, op.
cit. supra note 5, §§ 5850-52, 5951.
8 E.g., Fanchon 8: Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F .2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
See 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 5929.
9 E.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1935). See 13 FLETCHER,
op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 5850-52, 5951.
lOE.g., Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
n It is important to distinguish these two stockholders' derivative suit remedies
which arise out of the violation of statutes, such as the federal antitrust laws, which do
not expressly create stockholder actions, from an action under a provision of a statute
that does in terms create such a remedy. An example of the latter is section 16 (b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1958).
«I See generally 13 FLETCHER,
7 E.g., Greenwood v. Union
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vehicle to obtain injunctive relief.12 But the same was not true
with respect to the treble damage remedy. Due to the niceties of
the historical distinction between law and equity it was established, by two early Supreme Court cases, that a stockholders'
derivative suit would not lie to recover treble damages under the
antitrust laws. In 1916 Mr. Justice Holmes closed the door in
Fleitman v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co.13 by holding that the treble
damages provision was a legal remedy and would not lie in an
equitable derivative suit which would deprive the defendants of
their right to a jury trial on that issue. Mr. Justice Brandeis locked
and bolted the door a year later in United Copper Sec. Co. v.
Amalgamated Copper Co.14 by holding that a derivative action is
purely equitable and that a plaintiff could not avoid the impact of
the Fleitman case by attempting to bring such an action on the
law side. Thus an impasse was reached which lasted until 1953.

B. The Law Since 1953
The procedural merger of law and equity was effected by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1939.15 The first stockholders' derivative suit to seek treble damages under the federal
antitrust laws after that date was Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount
Pictures,16 which came before the Second Circuit in 1953. The
trial court dismissed the treble damage count, holding the Federal
Rules to be of no avail since the issue of treble damages was "substantive" and therefore unaffected by the new rules.17 The Second
12Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953)
(dictum). The Fanchon rb- Marco case cites no prior case in which a derivative suit was
brought for injunctive relief under the federal antitrust laws and no prior cases have
been found. It has been asserted [Note, 5 STAN. L. REv. 480, 483 (1953)] that such suits
would not lie prior to the Fanchon rb- Marco decision, but the author cites only private
stockholder action cases, which are wholly inapposite. See note 5 supra. A stockholder
suing in the right of his corporation for threatened injury to the corporation would seem
to qualify as a "person [or] ••• corporation ••• threatened [by] ••• loss or damage by
a violation of the antitrust laws," 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958), and the
difficulties encountered in seeking the treble damage remedy (see text accompanying note
13 infra) would seem to present no problem with regard to the equitable injunctive remedy. In any event, the Fanchon tr Marco case and every subsequent derivative suit which
has sought injunctive relief have held that such relief is now obtainable in a derivative
action. Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956); Schechtman v.
Wolfson, 141 F. Supp. 453 (1956), afj'd, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957).
13 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
14244 U.S. 261 (1917).
ll>FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
16202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953); 52 MICH. L. REv. 155 (1953); 49 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 383
(1954); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 1345 (1954).
17 Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), 52 CoLuM. L. REv. 1069 (1952), rev'd, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
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Circuit reversed, holding that the difficulty could easily be surmounted by trying the issue of the plaintiff stockholders' right to
sue to the judge and the question of damages to the jury. This
sound result has been followed without dissent in all subsequent
actions18 and now seems to be settled law.

II.

LIMITATIONS OF STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUIT UNDER THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS

The area under consideration involves the interplay of two
relatively discrete bodies of law: corporation law and federal antitrust law. When the various requirements of corporate and antitrust law are taken into consideration, the apparently broad sweep
of the Fanchon & Marco case will be found to be limited to cases
involving a rather narrow fact situation.

A. Suits To Redress Corporate Injury Resulting From
Anti-Competitive Effects of Antitrust Violation
I. Where Person Causing Violation Does Not Dominate Corporation. When the corporation has a cause of action under the
antitrust laws against one or more third parties who in no way
dominate the corporation and its management, the decision
whether to assert that cause of action would ordinarily be one
solely within the discretion of the corporation's directors; assertion
of the cause of action could be compelled by means of the stockholders' derivative suit only if it could be shown that this discretion had been abused.19 When it is the corporation itself which
has committed the antitrust violation, the corporation would have
no cause of action under the antitrust laws for the simple reason
that it has suffered no injury within the meaning of those laws.20
The injurious effects of the anti-competitive acts in question are
felt by the victims-competitors and the consuming public-not
by their author.
18 Rogers v. American Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. 1960); Gottesman v. General
Motors Corp., 171 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y.), petition for interlocutory appeal denied, 268
F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959); Kogan v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 20 F.R.D. 4 (D. Del. 1956); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (dictum). The recent developments
concerning derivative suits have not, of course, altered the rule that individual and representative stockholders' suits will not lie under the federal antitrust laws. Bookout v. Schine
Chain Theatres, 253 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1958). See note 5 supra.
10 13 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPORA110NS §§ 5945-60 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1961). The
derivative suit is most often available and necessary where the wrongdoer against whom
the corporation has a cause of action dominates the corporation and thereby blocks the
corporation's bringing suit. Id. § 5945. See also Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Gas. Co., 330
U.S. 518, 522-23 (1946) (dictum).
20 See text accompanying notes 24-30 infra.
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2. Where Person Causing Violation Dominates Corporation.
Where, however, the corporation is injured by anti-competitive
acts for which persons are responsible who also dominate or control the corporation, the stockholders' derivative suit under the
antitrust laws will be available to redress this injury. The Fanchon
& Marco case itself arose in such a situation. There A corporation
and B corporation formed C corporation, each taking back fifty
percent of C's stock and each naming two of C's four directors.
B corporation engaged in a restraint of trade by which C was
victimized and made to forego profits. Corporation A then
brought an action against B under the antitrust laws for treble
damages and for an order enjoining B from voting its stock in
C. A's petition contained three counts, all based upon the same
antitrust violation: (I) a claim by A individually in its capacity as
stockholder in C; (2) a claim by C corporation itself; and (3) a
claim by A as a stockholder of C suing derivatively to assert C's
claim. The first count was dismissed under the familiar rule that
a stockholder's private action does not lie under the antitrust
laws.21 The second was likewise rejected because A could not
authorize suit in C's corporate name without the concurrence of
B and since B was defendant in the suit, such concurrence was not
forthcoming. But the third count, asserting a derivative right of
action as a stockholder of C, was upheld. The injury to corporation C caused by defendants' conduct was direct and of the very
type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent or redress. And
a derivative suit under those laws was the appropriate - indeed,
the only - way in which to invoke their protection. Because the
wrongdoer itself controlled the management of the injured corporation, the latter was otherwise powerless to assert its cause of
action.
Thus a derivative action under the federal antitrust laws to
redress corporate injury flowing from the anti-competitive efjects
of an antitrust violation will be available only where one or more
of the violators dominates the plaintiffs' corporation. The
Fanchon & Marco case and all subsequent actions22 for this type of
injury have shared this factual situation.
See note 5 supra.
Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956); Rogers v. American
Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. 1960); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 171 F. Supp.
661 (S.D.N.Y.), petition for interlocutory appeal denied, 268 F.2d 194- (2d Cir. 1959); Kogan
v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 20 F.R.D. 4 (D. Del. 1956); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp.
132 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (dictum).
21
22
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B. Suits To Redress Corporate Injury Resulting From Legal
Consequences of Corporation's Own Violation of Antitrust Laws
All that has gone before has concerned corporate losses resulting when the corporation is the victim of an antitrust violation.
But corporate injury can also result indirectly from an antitrust
infringement when the corporation is itself the violating party.
The corporation is then susceptible to losses in the form of fines,
single damages, treble damages, and litigation expenses assessed
or incurred in suits brought against it by the government, by
private parties, or by both, whether terminated by judgment, consent decree, or settlement.23 Of course, such losses do, in a broad
sense, arise out of an antitrust infringement. The question then
arises whether a stockholder of the guilty corporation could bring
a derivative action under the antitrust laws to make the corporation whole by holding liable for the resulting injury the directors
or officers who caused the corporation to violate those laws.
Several considerations seem to indicate that such a suit would not
be available in this situation.
The federal antitrust laws provide two exclusive remedies to
private parties: (1) an action for treble damages in favor of "any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws,"24 and (2) injunctive
relief "against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
antitrust laws."25 The injury or damage contemplated by the
statutes has been held to be only such as directly flows from injury
to the competitive system in that sector of the economy at which
the illegal acts are aimed. 26 The classic statement of this rule is
!!3 Injunctions against further illegal practices and divestiture of assets the holding
of which has been found illegal complete the possible consequences attendant on antitrust
infringement. See Clayton Act§ 11, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958),
and Clayton Act § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958). Since these remedies
merely return the corporation to the status quo before the violation, no "loss" is incurred
in the sense in which that word is used in this discussion.
24 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
2t; 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
26 E.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952); Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d
Cir. 1958) (L. Hand, J.) (private action by stockholder for diminution in value of his
stock resulting from antitrust violation to corporation); Productive Inventions, Inc. v.
Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955) (suit by patentee for loss of royalties due
to violations against licensee); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955)
(private stockholder claim). For an excellent discussion of this rule by Chief Judge
Yankwich, see Hess v. Anderson, Clayton &: Co., 20 F.R.D. 466, 475-78 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
Injury to consumers as well as to competitors is, of course, the type of direct injury at
which the antitrust laws aim. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1948).
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contained in Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc.21 There
a conspiracy was alleged among the various "majors" of the motion
picture industry aimed at destroying the various "independents"
of the industry. Plaintiff labor union alleged that as a result of
this antitrust violation its members were unable to obtain employment on as favorable conditions as had previously been possible.
The court dismissed plaintiff's action for treble damages and injunctive relief because the injury alleged was not of the type contemplated by the antitrust laws. The court stated:
"The [plaintiff's] ... connection with the alleged illegal
conspiracy is not such as would bring them within the contemplation of the anti-trust law. The entire import of the
conspiracy, insofar as competitive conditions are concerned,
is the attempt to destroy the Independents. . . . The damage
alleged to have been suffered by appellants does not flow from
any injury to the competitive situation....
"[I]n order to state a cause of action under the anti-trust
laws a plaintiff must show more than that . . . the conspiracy
was in restraint of trade and that an act has been committed
which harms him. He must show that he is within that area of
the economy which is endangered by a break.down of competitive conditions in a particular industry. Otherwise he is not injured 'by reason' of anything forbidden in the anti-trust
laws."28
The injury in the situation under discussion is believed to be of
like nature. Rather than having been injured by the anti-competitive effects of its own acts, the corporation has suffered loss due
to the legal consequences of having engaged in such acts. The
injury - damages and penalties - is causally but not legally connected to the antitrust violation. In Gomberg v. Midvale Co.20
stockholders sought in a derivative suit to enjoin their directors
from consummating a proposed merger between the corporation
and one of its competitors. Plaintiffs claimed that the merger
would be in violation of the federal antitrust laws and would
subject the corporation to the threat of loss from damages and
penalties in potential civil and criminal antitrust actions against
the corporation. Judge Ganey dismissed the claim, citing the
Loew's case:
27193 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
at 54-55.
29157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
28 Id.
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"In sum the injury which the [antitrust] laws envision is the
injury to the economy of the plaintiff, by virtue of restrictions
of trade or something that proximately flows from it... .
" ... The money which [plaintiffs' corporation] ... may,
in some future time, be required to pay as treble damages or
penalties as the result of possible actions brought against them
for violations of the antitrust laws, is not threatened harm or
damages which proximately flow from the violations within
the meaning of Section 16."30
By parity of reasoning, such damages and penalties when actually
assessed are not the type injury to the corporation's business or
property required by statute for imposition of treble damages.
Moreover, any recovery by the corporation under the antitrust laws would be in treble the amount of the prior fines or
damages. In the case of fines this would mean that the directors
would be forced to pay three times that which the court in the
prior action had determined to be the appropriate penalty for the
violations. With regard to treble damages recovered in a prior
action, the effect would be to assess the directors nine times the
damage caused. The former would over-penalize the directors;
the latter would overcompensate the corporation. If the treble
damage provision is compensatory in nature,31 there is trebling
because the unliquidated nature of the actual damages makes proof
of their full amount almost impossible. Here, however, the maximum damages would be fixed and certain; no trebling would be
necessary to approximate full compensation. Indeed, to treble
already-trebled damages would be to render them punitive, contrary to the intent of Congress hypothesized above. Even if a
contrary hypothesis is true - that treble damages were intended
by Congress to be punitive in nature - a second trebling would
unjustifiably increase the sanction which Congress had thus
deemed proper to impose. Thus an action of this nature might
well be foreclosed on the additional ground that it would be out
of harmony with the remedial scheme established in the federal
antitrust statutes.
A final consideration is that the antitrust laws do not seem intended as vehicles for the adjustment of intracorporate loss-bearing. Support for this conclusion seems evident in the fact that the
80 Id.

at 142. Accord, Fein v. Security Banknote C.O., 157 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-trust Act Penal or Compensatory?

81 Vold,

28 KY. L.J. 117 (1940).
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antitrust laws contain separate and distinct provisions concerning
violations by corporations, on the one hand, and by individual
corporate officers, on the other.
Thus an action is not available under the antitrust laws by
which a corporation can hold the responsible officers liable for
losses flowing from the legal consequences of their acts which
caused the corporation to violate the antitrust laws. An alternative remedy does, however, appear to be available. This alternative, which will be explored in the remainder of this comment, is
directed specifically to the type of loss here involved, provides for
single rather than treble damages, and is expressly designed to
adjust intracorporate equities.

III.

STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE FIDUCIARY DUTY ACTION

AGAINST DIRECTORS OR OFFICERS VIOLATING OR CAUSING THEIR

CORPORATION

To

VIOLATE THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS

Directors and officers owe their corporation a fiduciary duty to
promote its best interests and keep it from loss.32 It is beyond the
scope of this comment to cover all facets of this relationship and
its consequences. Several features, only, are here material. Management owes the corporation a duty of reasonable care in the
direction of its affairs.33 It must refrain from engaging, or causing
the corporation to engage, in illegal or ultra vires activities.34
Violating or causing the corporation to violate a statute involves
a breach of fiduciary duty if the director knew or should, in the
exercise of reasonable care, have known that the statute would be
violated.35 A stockholders' derivative suit will generally lie to
hold the directors personally liable to the corporation for all loss
sustained by it which is causally connected with a statutory violation36 and to restrain a prospective or continuing violation.37
82 See

generally 3 FLEI'CHER, PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS §§ 990, 1100 (perm. ed. rev. vol.

1947).
33E.g., Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918).
FLErCHER, op. cit. supra
84 See 3 FLETCHER, op. cit.

See 3

note 32, §§ 1029-64.

supra note 32, §§ 1021-28; BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 65,

106 (1946).
85 Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum&: Transp. Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d
934 (1941); Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935); Williams v. McDonald,
37 N.J. Eq. 409 (1883); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS§ 155 (2d ed. 1949). The fact that the statute
violated does not in terms provide for such liability is not controlling. Thompson v.
Greeley, 107 Mo. 577, 17 S.W. 962 (1891). Cf. note 11 supra.
86E.g., Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co. v. Kingsbury, 59 Idaho 627, 85 P.2d 691 (1938).
87 E.g., DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y. Supp. 912 (1937), aff'd,
276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1938).
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Three elements are necessary to establish such a cause of action:
that the statute was violated, that the directors knew or should
have known their acts were illegal, and that the corporation was
thereby injured. This comment will explore whether such a
"fiduciary suit" will lie when the statute violated is one of the
federal antitrust laws.

A. The Fiduciary Suit Based on the Antitrust Laws Distinguished
From an Action Under the Antitrust Laws
It is imperative at the outset to distinguish clearly between
an action under the antitrust laws and an action against directors
or officers for a breach of their fiduciary duty which is founded on
their violation of the antitrust laws. An action under the antitrust laws lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.38 Such an action seeks to vindicate a right created by a
body of federal statutes and enforceable only in a federal court
and to receive remedies provided by those statutes and no others.39
A suit based on breach of fiduciary duty vindicates a right created
by the common law of the state; the remedies are provided by
state law and such suits lie primarily in state courts.40 The federal
antitrust laws are involved, if at all, only to the extent that their
violation provides one substantive element of the state cause of
action: the illegality of the acts complained of. Thus when the
federal antitrust laws are relied upon merely to establish the
element of illegality necessary to show a breach of fiduciary duty
and not to seek recovery under the antitrust laws, no federal question is raised upon which to predicate federal jurisdiction.41 Similarly, if a fiduciary suit is in a federal court on diversity grounds
alone, the federal court applies state law and its use of the anti38Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943); Blumenstock Bros. Advertising
Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436 (1920); Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y. 142,
51 N.E.2d 681 (1943); McMaster v. Ford Motor Co., 114 S.C. 100, 103 S.E. 87 (1920); Gold
Fuel Serv., Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 59 N.J. Super. 6, 157 A.2d 30 (Super. Ct. 1959);
Clayton v. Farrish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Williamson v. Columbia
Gas &: Elec. Co., 27 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del.), afj'd, 110 F.2d 15 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 639 (1940); American Ref. Co. v. Gasoline Prods. Co., 294 s:w. 967 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927); Venner v. New York C. &: H.R.R., 177 App. Div. 296, 164 N.Y.S. 626 (1917), afj'd
mem., 226 N.Y. 583, 123 N.E. 893, cert. denied, 249 U.S. 617 (1919).
30 A. B. Small Co. v. Lamborn &: Co., 267 U.S. 248 (1925); Meyer v. Kansas City So.
R.R., 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 607 (1936); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138
F. Supp. 560 (D. Del.), afj'd, 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956).
40 Meyer v. Kansas City So. R.R., supra note 39.
41 Ibid. See also Annot., 14 A.L.R2d 1185 (1950).
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trust violation is limited to the same extent the state court's would
be.42

B. The Effect of a Prior Adjudication of Illegality Under the Act
It has been noted above that the plaintiff stockholder must
prove three elements to maintain his fiduciary action: violation of
the antitrust laws, the particularized scienter or negligence required, and causally-connected damages. What would be the
effect upon the proof of these three elements of a prior adjudication in a federal court of the illegality of the acts complained of in
the fiduciary action?

I. The Issue of Illegality. By far the greatest impediment to
the successful maintenance of a fiduciary action for violation of
the antitrust laws has been the difficulty, real or imagined, in
establishing the requisite element of illegality by proof in a state
court of the violation of federal statutes.43 Since the plaintiff in
the prior action could never be or represent the stockholders'
corporation, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would not generally
be available to make the prior adjudication of violation binding
on the defendant directors on the issue of illegality.44 It is true
that the corporation is the real party in interest in the fiduciary
action and that both the corporation and the directors and officers
are likely to be joined as parties defendant in the antitrust action.
It is further true that coparties can be later bound by collateral
estoppel but only as to issues on which they took adverse positions.4 G
By no means is the requirement of adverseness satisfied concerning
the issue of violation of the antitrust laws as between the corpora42 Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955). This would also appear
to be true where a derivative fiduciary suit is joined with an action under the federal
antitrust laws which confers federal question jurisdiction on the federal court. E.g.,
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 171 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y.), petition for interlocutory
appeal denied, 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959).
43 See Gomberg v. Midvale Co., supra note 42 (applying Pennsylvania law); Clayton
v. Farrish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Hoffman v. Abbott, 180 l\fisc.
590, 40 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Diamond v. Davis, 263 App. Div. 68, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582
(1941). Compare Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup.
Ct. 1942), afj'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
44 Cf. Kessler v. Fligel, 240 App. Div. 232, 269 N.Y. Supp. 664, appeal dismissed, 264
N.Y. 689, 191 N.E. 628 (1934). See generally Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56
HARv. L. R.Ev. I (1942). The rule in California, however, would make the prior adjudication of illegality binding on the directors who were joined as defendants in the prior
action. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'! Trust &: Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942).
45 RF..sTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942); Developments in the Law - Res Judicata,
65 HARV. L. R.Ev. 818, 860-61 (1952). But see 36 GEO. L.J. 441 (1948) which urges a
contrary result, apparently overlooking the requirement of adverseness.
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tion and its officers and directors joined as defendants in an antitrust action. Section 5 (a) of the Clayton Act46 is likewise of no
avail. That section provides that a judgment obtained by the
United States in an antitrust action shall be prima facie evidence
against the defendant in any action brought by any other party
"under said [antitrust] laws" growing out of the adjudged violation.47 But the fiduciary duty suit does not arise under the antitrust laws. As a practical matter, however, the prior adjudication
will be most persuasive authority in the fiduciary suit. A state
court must, in deciding an issue arising out of a federal statute,
look to federal law. 48 The finding of a violation of the federal
antitrust laws by a federal court in a prior action involving the
same conduct by the same defendants would doubtless be most
persuasive to the state court on the issue of illegality in the
fiduciary action. However, the state court ·will not be able to rely
upon a federal court determination of the antitrust violation issue
as binding on it by res judicata or otherwise. The state court will
therefore not entertain this type of action unless it conceives itself
to possess the power to interpret the federal antitrust statutes.

2. The Issue of State of Mind. Where the alleged illegality
consists of the violation of a statute, plaintiff must show that the
director knew or should have known he was violating or causing
the corporation to violate the act.49 Actual intent to commit an
act kno-tvn to be illegal is always sufficient.50 Where this intent is
lacking, plaintiff must prove that had the director used reasonable
care he would have known the act was prohibited. 51 The state of
mind required to be sho-tvn to find a violation under the antitrust
laws is often markedly different. Negligence is never a factor.
The intent required to constitute a violation of most of the statutes'
provisions is merely the general intent to do the act later held to
46 38 Stat. 7111 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
47 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

§

16 (1958).

48 Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Moser, 275 U.S. 133 (1927); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821). See also Note, 48 CoLUr.r. L. REv. 943 (1948).
40 See cases cited in note 35 supra. Where the statute clearly and unambiguously
relates to the duties of corporate officers or directors, there is authority to the effect that
mere violation thereof conclusively establishes a breach of fiduciary duty. E.g., Broderick
v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413, 272 N.Y. Supp. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1934). The federal antitrust statutes are not, of course, of this nature.
1iO Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935); Medford Trust Co. v.
McKnight, 292 Mass. 1, 197 N.E. 649 (1935); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum &
Transp. Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1941).
51 Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942),
aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
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be illegal.52 This is demonstrably quite different from the intent
to do an act known to be illegal.153 In short, a prior adjudication
of illegality not only is not binding, but also has no necessary
relevance to the determination of the issue of intent or negligence
in the fiduciary suit.154 Negligence is material in one and immaterial in the other; "intent" is not necessarily required in either
and to the extent it may be present in both, it may well be tested
by different criteria.
3. The Issue of Damages. Breach of fiduciary duty is not
actionable unless the corporation has suffered or is threatened with
damage directly attributable thereto.155 The treble damages, fines,
and litigation costs incurred in a prior adjudication are clear,
definite, and easily proved losses to the corporation. Since the
breach alleged in the fiduciary action consists of precisely those
acts which led to such losses in the prior antitrust action, they are
not only recoverable but would usually constitute the upper limit
of the recovery. 56 Indeed, this ability to recover the losses suffered
by the corporation in a prior antitrust suit is the principal advantage which the fiduciary action has over the derivative suit
under the antitrust laws which cannot recoup these losses. And
while the stockholder may well not desire, by use of an antitrust suit, to plunge his corporation into antitrust litigation, when
another has successfully done so it is clearly to the stockholders'
interest to hold the delinquent directors or officers liable to the
corporation for its resulting losses.

C. Case Law on the Fiduciary Suit Involving an Antitrust
Violation
Relatively few cases have squarely presented the question
whether a fiduciary action will lie where the breach of duty alleged
52 Specific intent must be shown to make out an attempt to monopolize under § 2
of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); Swift &: Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928). For the
other criminal provisions a general intent to do the illegal act is all that is required and
it need not be shown that the defendant knew the act to be illegal at the time he com•
mitted it. United States v. General Instrument Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157 (D.N.J. 1949);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 51 F. Supp. 613 (D.D.C. 1943).
53 See text accompanying note 102 infra.
54 Cf. Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 640 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
55E.g., Diamond v. Davis, 263 App. Div. 68, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1941). The Diamond
case enunciated the damage requirement and said further that damage could not be
inferred from the mere fact of violation of the federal antitrust laws.
56 Clayton v. Farrish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947). Cf. Sellers v.
Head, 261 Ala. 212, 73 So. 2d 747 (1954) (tax penalty); Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co. v. Kings•
bury, 59 Idaho 627, 85 P.2d 691 (1938) (tax penalty); Hackner v. Van Wyck, 324 Ill. App.
521, 58 N.E.2d 315 (1944) (fine; nonsuit on technical pleading grounds).
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consists solely of a violation of the federal antitrust laws. Such
authority as there is, despite some confusion, indicates that the
action is maintainable.
1. The Early Federal Cases. In 1914 the issue whether a
violation of the federal antitrust laws constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty which would support a stockholders' derivative suit
based on traditional equitable principles, as distinct from an action
based on antitrust laws themselves, was first raised in De Koven v.
Lake Shore & M.S. Ry.67 The plaintiff minority stockholder there
sought to restrain the majority stockholders of his corporation
from merging with competitors. One count of three was predicated on the ground that the merger would violate the Sherman
Act. Despite its recognition of the fact that only the United States
had, under the terms of the act, the power to enjoin its violation,
the court held this count stated a good cause of action, reasoning:

"The plaintiffs contend that the bill is not a suit in equity
under the Sherman Act.... [This] contention is correct. The
present suit is one by a dissenting minority stockholder to
restrain the majority stockholders from accomplishing what
is asserted to be an illegal or ultra vires act. It is, therefore, a
well recognized species of general equitable jurisdiction, and
not a mere statutory remedy conferred by the antitrust law.
. . . [T]he fact that ... [the Act provides a separate remedy of
which he is unable to avail himself] cannot be held to deprive
an individual of an equitable remedy which was open to him
before and independent of the statute.... [T]hat the illegal or
ultra vires act is made so only by the statute [cannot change
the result] .... If it be an illegal or ultra vires act, however
made so, a minority stockholder has ... a ... remedy of which
he is not deprived by the creation of a statutory . . . remedy
... of which he is not permitted to avail." 58
This early case clearly and properly distinguished the essential
difference between an action under the statute and one for breach
of fiduciary duty founded on the violation of that statute. It
properly recognized that a court's inability to grant relief under
the former in no way precludes its maintenance of the latter since
the rights sought to be vindicated and the relief sought spring
from different sources. And, finally, it understood that their interrelation lies in the fact that proof of violation of the antitrust
acts is a requisite of both. The confused state of the law in this
117 216 Fed. 955
118 Id. at 957-58.

(S.D.N.Y. 1914).
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area has resulted largely from a lack of appreciation by state courts
of these several factors.
In 1931 the cases of Guiterman v. Pennsylvania R.R.59 and
Hand v. Kansas City So. Ry.60 extended the reasoning of De Koven
to fiduciary actions for damages resulting from alleged violations.
Both actions were started in state courts and removed to the federal
court. In both, motions to dismiss were made on the ground that
the state courts had no jurisdiction to grant relief under the federal
antitrust law and that therefore the federal court obtained none on
removal. Both motions were denied for reasons illustrated by the
court's language in Hand:
" 'It is now settled law that the remedies provided by the
[Sherman] Act ... for enforcing the rights created by it are
exclusive... .' This declaration, however, is of no present aid
to defendants, for the reason that plaintiff is not here seeking
to enforce a right created by that act. On the contrary, he is
seeking merely to redress an injury to the corporate defendant
as a result of an effort on the part of the defendant directors
to accomplish a public ·wrong. There is therefore no occasion
to measure plaintiff's remedial rights by the statutory penalties
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.'' 61
The court in Guiterman made the implication express:
"There is nothing . . . to warrant . . . the inference that the
[Supreme Court has] excluded a state court from jurisdiction
as to all rights which might relate to the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.
"[T]he issue is whether the defendant directors committed
an ultra vires act.... The particular ultra vires act alleged to
have been committed arises out of the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act. The Supreme Court of the State of New York
certainly has jurisdiction in causes in which stockholders
charge directors with malfeasance. That such malfeasance
may arise out of a violation of a federal statute should not
deprive the state court of jurisdiction. . . .
"I conclude, therefore, that the state court had jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of this suit.'' 62
In both the Hand and Guiterman cases, the federal district
courts felt they had federal question jurisdiction because of the
59 48

F.2d 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1931).
55 F.2d 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
61Id. at 713-14.
62 Guiterman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 851, 853, 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1931).
60
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necessity to decide whether the federal antitrust laws had in fact
been violated even though the actions were not brought under the
antitrust laws. This proposition was expressly disapproved five
years later by the Second Circuit in Meyer v. Kansas City So. Ry.63
The Meyer case presented essentially the identical cause of action
asserted in Hand and Guiterman and so the court, finding no
diversity, dismissed the action for want of federal jurisdiction.64
An analysis of these three cases would seem to indicate that the
fiduciary suit is based on a theory of liability arising out of state
common law, creating a remedy available in state courts, even
though the illegal act on which it relies consists of a breach of a
federal statute.
2. The State Court Cases. Of the few state court fiduciary
suits which have been predicated on antitrust violations, several
evidence an apparent inability on the part of the court or counsel
to analyze correctly the issues involved in the action or to appreciate its potential utility. For example, the difficulty in Hoffman
v. Abbott, 65 in which plaintiff was nonsuited, lay clearly with
counsel's drafting of the three causes of action. He alleged, in
substance, (1) that the directors had conspired with each other to
effect a monopoly resulting in listed actual damages to the corporation, (2) that the corporation had been indicted for violation of
the federal antitrust laws, and (3) that the directors knowingly
had violated the Robinson-Patman Act. 66 Nowhere did plaintiff
allege that the violations of the antitrust acts themselves constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore the court, without
considering this possibility, nonsuited plaintiff since there was no
other ground from which a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties
could be implied. In Diamond v. Davis6 1 counsel seemingly
failed to plead sufficient facts to prove an alleged violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act; the court properly held a consent decree
obtained by the United States would establish neither the statutory
violation nor the facts showing any injury flowed therefrom - two
essential elements of the cause of action.
The most disturbing case is Clayton v. Farrish.68 There it was
alleged that the defendant directors caused the corporation to enter
into a cartel arrangement. The corporation agreed to a consent
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 607 (1936).
14 A.L.R.2d 1185 (1950).
65180 Misc. 590, 40 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
66 49 Stat. 1526 (1936); 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
67 263 App. Div. 68, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1941).
os 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
63 84 F.2d 411 (2d
64 See also Annot.,
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decree under the federal antitrust laws. As a result, the corporation suffered substantial injury in lost profits, fines, and litigation
expenses. The plaintiff stockholder sought to hold the directors
liable in the amount thereof. Two breaches of fiduciary duty were
alleged: (1) that the directors had served the interests of the other
corporation when these conflicted with those of their own corporations, and (2) that the acts were illegal because in violation of the
antitrust laws. The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds,
inter alia, that the court was without jurisdiction of the subject
matter because the suit was predicated upon the federal antitrust
laws. The defendants urged in support of this motion that the
state court was without jurisdiction to determine whether the
directors' acts violated the antitrust acts and that a "determination
by this court that the agreements in question did, in fact, contravene the federal antitrust laws is . . . a condition precedent to
the granting of the relief demanded." To this contention the
court, in denying the motion to dismiss, stated succinctly, "I do not
agree. . . . Even after eliminating from . . . the complaint the
irrelevant allegations that the cartel agreement violated the federal
antitrust laws . . . the remaining allegations state a cause of
action ...." 69 It is easy to agree with the court that the nonstatutory allegation stated a cause of action, that the ruling on the
motion was correct in result, and that all the damages alleged including those directly attributable to the consent decree were
proper elements of recovery. In view of the separate ground the
statutory violation allegation was unnecessary, but was it "irrelevant"? The cases cited in support of the dictum do not sustain
it.70 The whole thrust of the court's reasoning is contained in this
brief passage:
"[L]iability cannot be imposed on defendants by this court
merely because they violated the federal antitrust laws. The
basis of their liability must be acts which fail to conform to
. fid uciary
.
d uty...." 71
their
It is abundantly clear that the court either did not realize that a
statutory violation itself could be a breach of duty or else, while
69 Id. at I 46,
70 The court

73 N .Y.S.2d at 737-38. (Emphasis added.)
relied principally on Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y. 142, 51 N.E.2d 681
(1943). That case is wholly inapposite for two reasons: (1) It was an action under the
federal antitrust laws and so, of course, the state court had no jurisdiction. See text
accompanying and cases cited in note 38 supra. (2) It was not a suit based on breach of
fiduciary duty. Thus the court in Clayton failed to make the fundamental distinction
described in section III-A of this comment.
71 Clayton v. Farrish, 191 Misc. 136, 153, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727, 744 (Sup. Ct. 1947).

1961]

COMMENTS

921

accepting that principle, felt that a state court was without power
to decide whether the directors' acts in fact violated a federal
statute. If the former is true, the case may be dismissed as illconsidered.72 However, the validity of the latter alternative should
be examined, for this proposition was adopted by the court in
Gomberg v. Midvale Co.73 as a basis for decision. Gomberg v.
Midvale Co., as noted above, was a stock.holders' derivative action
to enjoin the common directors of their corporation and a competing corporation from consummating a proposed merger alleged to
be violative of the federal antitrust laws. Relief was sought primarily under the laws themselves. But there was also diversity of
citizenship and the stockholders prayed that the court retain
jurisdiction if it found against them on the federal count and,
sitting as a state court, restrain the merger as illegal under the
federal antitrust laws and hence as an ultra vires act which, if
permitted, would be in breach of the directors' fiduciary duty
under state law. After holding against plaintiffs on the antitrust
count, the court cavalierly disposed of the latter alternative contention in two sentences:
"It is claimed that the sale of assets will violate the federal antitrust law and is therefore ultra vires. Since the acts herein
complained of are primarily acts which only a federal court
could take jurisdiction of ... a Pennsylvania court would hold
that redress if any would have to be relegated to the federal
court under the antitrust laws." 74
This statement is, or should be, wrong.
3. Does a State Court Have the Power To Decide Whether
Acts Violate a Federal Statute Where This is a Necessary Element
in a State Cause of Action? A state court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a derivative action against directors and officers
'12 Investment .Associates v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 48 A.2d
501 (1946), aff'd 29 Del. Ch. 593, 51 A.2d 572 (1947), is believed to be subject to criticism
on this ground. That case involved a derivative fiduciary duty action predicated on a
violation of § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n (1958). It can be inferred from the report that it was urged upon the court that the
statutory violation constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. The court, apparently failing
to appreciate that fact, discussed only the question whether a private party could sue
under the statute; this question it answered in the negative. While the answer given was
correct, it was in response to the wrong question.
73 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
'14. Jd. at 142.
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for breach of their fiduciary duty to the corporation.75 When that
breach is alleged to consist of a violation of the federal antitrust
laws, such violation is, of course, an essential element of that subject
matter.76 It is only to supply this element of illegality to the state
action that recourse is required to the federal statute.77 No right
created by that statute nor remedy provided thereby is sought.
Can the declaration of illegality in the statute be separated from
the rights and remedies which it creates? The acts themselves
support an affirmative answer. Section 1 of the Sherman Act,78
illustratively, simply provides that certain conduct "is declared to
be illegal"; the rights and remedies flowing from the condition of
illegality thus created are elsewhere specified. This condition of
illegality attaches to the proscribed conduct regardless of those
rights and remedies. A contract in restraint of trade does not
vacillate between legality and illegality in proportion to its relative
proximity to a federal courthouse.79
Of course, the existence of this condition of illegality must be
judicially determined before a defendant can be made to suffer
any consequences attaching to it. Does a state court, for the purposes of an action arising under its own law, have the power to
adjudicate an issue by reference to the law of another jurisdiction,
state, federal, or foreign? More specifically, does the state court,
to supply the requisite element of illegality, have the power to adjudicate whether certain acts contravene a federal statute? The
general statement of the question is answered affirmatively by reference to familiar principles of conflict of laws80 and to the practice
75De Koven v. Lake Shore&: M.S. Ry., 216 Fed. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); Guiterman v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1931); Hand v. Kansas City So. Ry., 55 F.2d
712 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Meyer v. Kansas City So. Ry., 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 607 (1936); Diamond v. Davis, 263 App. Div. 68, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1941); Simon v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), afj'd mem., 267
App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
76 E.g., Diamond v. Davis, supra note 75.
77 E.g., Meyer v. Kansas City So. Ry., 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 299 U.S.
607 (1936).
78 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U .S.C. § 1 (1958).
79 Thus state courts have refused to enforce contracts found to be illegal because
violative of the federal antitrust laws. See text accompanying and cases cited note 90 infra.
so There are limitations, of course, on the types of foreign statutes a court will
enforce. For example, penal statutes and statutes designed solely to further the governmental interests of the enacting jurisdiction will not be enforced by a foreign forum.
REsTATEMENT, CoNFLicrs OF LA.w §§ 610-11 (1934). These limitations, however, are inapplicable to the derivative fiduciary duty action because that suit does not seek to enforce
the statute on whose violation it is predicated. See section III-A of this comment;
compare text accompanying note 86 infra. But see Steckler v. Pennroad Corp., 44 F. Supp.
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of the federal courts in diversity cases.81 An affirmative answer
to the specific question is indicated, for the De Koven and Meyer
cases evidence not only that a court, state or federal, with equitable
jurisdiction has the power to decide in a fiduciary suit whether the
federal antitrust laws have been violated but also that this issue
does not even raise a federal question. Moreover, a line of closely
analogous authority also exists. It seems clear that a stockholders'
derivative fiduciary suit ·will lie to hold directors or officers personally liable to their corporation for the amount of penalties
assessed against it for violations of the federal tax statutes where the
breach of fiduciary duty consists solely in the violation of those
statutes.82 Two state supreme courts have reached this result.83
Since res judicata was not applicable in either case to make binding
on the state courts the prior finding by the Internal Revenue
Service of a violation of the federal statute, the power to readjudicate that issue and the exercise of that power by the state courts is
implicit in their judgments.
The state court, then, has the power to adjudicate, for its mvn
purposes, whether the federal antitrust statutes have been violated.
And refusal to do so, therefore, could stem only from a reticence as
a matter of policy to exercise that power. There are numerous
examples of such policy-dictated self-restraint.84 What policy
factors are applicable with respect to the federal antitrust laws?
The court might desire to effectuate a supposed intent of Congress
800 (E.D. Pa. 1942), afj'd, 136 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757 (1943) (dictum;
applying state law). Compare Gilbert v. Burnside, 197 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1959), which
allowed a fiduciary suit based on a similar foreign state statute.
81 See Erie R.R. v.
82 Sellers v. Head,

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
261 Ala. 212, 73 So. 2d 747 (1954); Coeurs D'Alenes Lead Co. v.
Kingsbury, 59 Idaho 627, 85 P.2d 691 (1938). See Lasser &: Holzman, Personal Liability
of Directors for Section 102 Surtaxes, The Controller, July, 1948, p. 342; 49 COLUM. L. REv.
394 (1949); 61 HARV. L. REv. 1058 (1948). A stockholders' derivative suit will lie to
enjoin excessive accumulations of corporate earnings since such accumulations would
violate section 531 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and hence constitute a breach
of the directors' fiduciary duty to the corporation. Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 119
N.E.2d 331 (1954); compare Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956),
holding such an action a private rather than a derivative suit.
83 Sellers v. Head, supra note 82; Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co. v. Kingsbury, supra note
82. Cf. Hackner v. Van Wyck, 324 Ill. App. 521, 58 N.E.2d 315 (1944).
84 Illustratively, the United States Supreme Court has uniformly refused to rule on
state statutes in diversity cases until the highest court of the state has had an opportunity
to do so. E.g., Louisiana Power&: Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959);
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies,
Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942). This policy-based self restraint does not, of course, affect the
court's ability or duty to take jurisdiction of the diversity suit. Meredith v. ·winter Haven,
320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943).
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that the remedies specified in the acts be exclusive.s 5 But the
:fiduciary duty action is not a remedy for an antitrust violation.
It is, rather, an intracorporate remedy to shift to the wrongdoer
the injurious consequences of his wrong which would otherw'ise be
ultimately borne by innocent, wronged parties. An analogy lies in
the operation of the "negligence per se" rule in tort law.so There
the plaintiff can rely on the fact of the defendant's violation of a
criminal statute or ordinance to establish the element of negligence
essential to his cause of action. And yet surely the legislature enacting the criminal statute conceived the state to be the only proper
moving party and the sanctions provided in the statute to be the
"exclusive remedies" for a violation thereof. The use of the
statutes in both instances is not to give a remedy for their violation,
but rather to supply a necessary element of a separate legal device
designed to shift to the wrongdoer the injurious consequences of
an act thereby made wrongful.s7 Another policy which arguably
85 The remedies specified in the federal antitrust laws are indeed the exclusive remedies for actions arising under those laws. See cases cited in note 39 supra. But this exclusivity relates only to actions under the laws, and can have no legitimate effect on remedies
-such as the fiduciary duty suit-which exist independently of them.
"Nothing is found in the federal anti-trust statutes expressly or impliedly providing
exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts respecting violations of individual, private rights.
The statutes provide only two civil remedies, i.e. injunctive relief • • • or treble damages...• These remedies are not available to plaintiff in a state court action because
they are cognizable in federal courts exclusively, and the state court has no jurisdiction
to give relief thereon. But these provisions relate to remedies. It is unreasonable to
maintain that the anti-trust statutes were intended to exclude persons who had common
law rights, arising from something also forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the acts,
from pursuing their remedies in a proper jurisdiction.•••
"I find no such Congressional intent or expression to such an effect here." Caraway
v. Ford Motor Co., 148 F. Supp. 776, 777 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
See also Southern States Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.S.C. 1939);
Boyd v. New York, N.H & H.R.R., 220 Fed. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); cases cited in note 75
supra.
86 See REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934); Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REv. 361 (1932); Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes
to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453 (1933).
87 While there are analogies, there are also important distinctions between the effect
of a statutory violation in a fiduciary action, on the one hand, and the effect of such a violation in an ordinary negligence suit, on the other. For example, in order that the negligence per se doctrine may be invoked the statute in question must have been a criminal
one, and the plaintiff must have been within the class of persons it was designed to
protect. REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934). Such limitations do not apply when a statutory violation is offered in a fiduciary duty action as proof of a director's breach of his
duty to the corporation. The similarities in the two actions are found, rather, in the fact
that in each the statutory violation plays only an auxiliary or evidentiary role. Spirt v.
Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956), illustrates the results of failing properly to distinguish between the two situations. There the plaintiff stockholder lost his derivative
fiduciary duty action because the court analyzed the case in terms of negligence per se
and, finding the plaintiff not to be within the class sought to be protected by the statute
in question, nonsuited him. That consideration would have been immaterial if the court
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militates against exercise of the state court's power is that uniformity of interpretation of the federal antitrust laws will best be
achieved by leaving their interpretation solely to the federal
courts.88 Counterbalanced against this consideration, however, is
the fact that if the state refused to interpret the federal acts the
plaintiff would have a clear state law right which the state court
would be powerless to remedy. Thus although directors injured
the corporation by federal antitrust law violations, the stock.holders
would be left totally remediless for losses from a prior adjudication under the antitrust laws and in all other cases where there
were no grounds for showing breach of fiduciary duty other than
in the violation of the statute.89
The policy question whether the state courts will exercise the
power they have to interpret the federal antitrust laws, however,
seems to be settled by a line of cases where state courts have regularly done so. It is established law that a state court will not
enforce a contract which violates the federal antitrust laws.90 In
passing on this defense, a number of state courts have necessarily
and expressly decided the question whether the contract before
them did in fact violate the acts.
Another argument which might be urged is that the state court
will use the federal antitrust laws as shield but not as a sword. The
distinction is not meritorious. If it means that state courts will
had analyzed the case with reference to fiduciary duty principles. The same observations
are applicable to Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944), and Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944).
88 This consideration was successfully urged, for example, with relation to § 14 of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1958), in
Investment Associates v. Standard Power &: Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 48 A.2d 501
(1946), aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 593, 51 A.2d 572 (1947) (dictum).
89 The stockholders may still have an action against the directors under the antitrust
laws, however, subject to the limitations noted in section II-A of this comment. It should
also be noted that the threat of such a third-party antitrust action is not sufficient
grounds for an injunction under the antitrust laws. Fein v. Sec. Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp.
146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
oo Alpha Beta Food Markets, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 147 Cal. App.2d
343, 305 P.2d 163 (1956); Schill v. Remington-Putnam Book Co., 182 Md. 153, 31 A.2d
467, aff'd on rehearing, 182 Md. 163, 32 A.2d 296 (1943); First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri
Glass Co., 169 Mo. App. 374, 152 S.W. 378 (1912); General Aniline &: Film Corp. v.
Bayer Co., 305 N.Y. 479, 113 N.E.2d 844 (1953); Metropolitan Opera Co. v. Hammerstein,
221 N.Y. 507, 116 N.E. 1061 (1917), affirming 162 App. Div. 691, 147 N.Y.S. 532 (1914).
Cf. A. B. Small Co. v. Lamborn&: Co., 267 U.S. 248 (1925). Contra, General Talking Picture Corp. v. DeMarce, 203 Minn. 28, 279 N.W. 750 (1938). Of course, a defendant cannot
get affirmative relief under the antitrust laws by way of counterclaim in a state action.
Pennsylvania-Dixie Cement Corp. v. H. Wales Lines Co., 119 Conn. 603, 178 Atl. 659 (1935);
Loew's, Inc. v. Don George, Inc., 237 La. 132, 110 So. 2d 553 (1959). See generally 5
WILLJSION, CONTRACTS §§ 1628-64 (1937); Lockhart, Violation of the Antitrust Laws as a
Defense in Civil Actions, 31 MINN. L. REv. 507 (1947).
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refuse to enforce the antitrust laws it is a mere truism.01 If it
means that a state court will ascertain the illegality of certain
conduct under the federal antitrust laws as a substantive element
of a defense in an action unrelated to those laws but not as substantive element of a cause of action which is equally unrelated to
those laws, it is a distinction without a substantial basis. Uniformity of interpretation and exclusivity of remedies, the policy
factors primarily applicable to this question which turns only on
policy, are no more frustrated when the state court interprets the
antitrust laws at the behest of the plaintiff than when it does so for
the defendant.02 The state courts have, therefore, the power to
use the federal antitrust laws in the manner urged, as a matter of
policy they should exercise this power, and in fact they do so in
closely analogous contexts. The final question is whether federallycreated illegality as well as illegality by reference to state law is of
the quality which a state court will find to constitute a breach of
fiduciary duty. The answer to this question is in the affirmative.03
4. Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.04 The Simon case implicitly affirms the above contentions. While the case unfortunately stands alone among state court authority it has never been
overruled or criticized and, hence, would seem to represent good
law.05 The Socony-Vacuum Company and its directors were convicted of violating the Sherman Act.00 As a result, great loss was
suffered by the corporation in the form of fines, treble damages,
and litigation expenses. Minority stockholders brought a derivative fiduciary suit in a New York court to hold directors liable to
the corporation for such losses on the ground that they caused the
corporation to violate the federal antitrust law in breach of their
fiduciary duties. The defendants, in effect, conceded the illegality
of their acts.97 Thus the court was spared the necessity of deter38 supra.
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that a contract was
unenforceable on the ground that it violated the federal antitrust laws. Defendant demurred, contending that jurisdiction lay exclusively in the federal courts. The court
held for plaintiff, construing the federal statutes in light of federal cases. Alpha Beta
Food Markets v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 147 Cal. App.2d 343, 305 P.2d 163 (1956).
03 See cases cited in note 75 supra.
94179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), affd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47
N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
95 The effect of Spinella v. Heights Ice Corp., 186 Misc. 996, 62 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup.
Ct. 1946), is hard to determine. The brief opinion cites with approval the Simon case
but is too cryptic to shed much light.
96 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
97 "That the defendant corporation participated in the unlawful buying program is
not disputed. Nor is it questioned that the defendants, as directors, participated therein in
91 See cases cited in note
02 Indeed, in one case a
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mining a violation. But since res judicata was not raised by the
situation, the court, in entering jurisdiction, must have held that
it had the power to adjudicate the fact of violation. The directors' conduct which was found illegal consisted of engaging in a
buying program which very competent counsel98 advised them was
legal. Indeed, the majority of the Second Circuit99 and even two
members of the Supreme Court agreed.100 The court, therefore,
properly found for the defendants on the ground that the directors did not know their acts were illegal and could not, in the
exercise of reasonable care, have known this. But the court by
entertaining the fiduciary action based on a federal antitrust violation confirmed the holdings of the Hand and Guiterman cases that
this type of action will lie in a state court.

D. Policy Considerations
The federal antitrust laws are extremely general. It is often
difficult for an honest businessman acting with utmost good faith
to stay within the laws, even with the aid of competent counsel.101
While these considerations should not affect the legal question
whether the fiduciary suit will lie, they should be carefully taken
into account by a court entertaining such an action in deciding
whether the directors or officers knew or should have known that
their conduct violated the antitrust laws. The reasoning of the
court in the Simon case is instructive in this regard:
"It is elementary that directors owe a corporation the duty
to exercise reasonable care in managing its affairs. . . .
"At most [the facts show the directors] ... made an honest
and reasonable mistake or error of judgment or of law....
"But it is argued that defendants are liable because they
committed acts prohibited by statute . . . even though they
acted in good faith and with reasonable care....
behalf of the corporation." Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 203, 38
N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 (Sup. Ct. 194-2), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
98 Failure to consult counsel may be evidence of negligence but is not conclusive.
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
90 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1939).
100 Justices Roberts and McReynolds, dissenting, felt the conduct complained of was
legal under the Sherman Act. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 254
(1940).
101 "[I]t must be confessed that there is no consistent or intelligible policy embodied
in our law by which •.• business men may distinguish bona fide pursuit of industrial
efficiency from an illicit program of industrial empire building." Jackson & Dumbauld,
Monopolies and the Courts, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 231, 237 (1938).
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"The rule is too broadly stated. . . .
"If the liability of a corporate officer is based on the . . .
violation of a statute ... the test of reasonable care ... applies
. . . [only] in so far as such care bears on whether he should
have known that the acts in question were ultra vires or expressly forbidden ....
"It seems to follow that, as the defendants ... did not know
or believe or have reason to believe that their participation in
the buying program was prohibited by the Sherman Act, they
cannot be held personally liable for damages."102
The staggering amount of the potential liability under statutes
which provide for treble damages and fines and which involve
great litigation expenses underscores the need for scrupulous attention to the issue of fault in the fiduciary suit. Personal liability
should, therefore, be restricted to three types of situations: (1)
Where the directors or officers knowingly violated the antitrust
laws, (2) where they have acted in bad faith, and (3) absent
scienter or bad faith, only where their acts constituted a per se violation of the antitrust laws.103 Only in the latter case is the antitrust law clear enough to predicate liability on negligence in not
having known that the given conduct was prohibited.
CONCLUSION

The Fanchon & Marco case has made it clear that a stock.holders' derivative suit will lie under the antitrust laws to redress, by
treble damages and injunctive relief, injury caused to the corporation by the anti-competitive effects of an antitrust violation.
Various requirements of corporation law and antitrust law, however, limit the availability of such a suit to the case where at least
one of the antitrust violators dominates the stock.holders' corporation.
Where a corporation's management causes it to violate the federal antitrust laws and the corporation is forced to pay fines or
102 Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 203-05, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273.74
(Sup. Ct. 1942), afj'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). Two writers have
assumed that proof of a violation of the antitrust statutes would per se constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty. 5 STAN. L. REv. 480 (1953); 36 G1::o. L.J. 441 (1948). This
assumption overlooks the marked difference between these two concepts illustrated in the
text in section II-A-I and by the language quoted from the Simon case.
103 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE
ANrrmUST LAws 12 (1955).
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damages and litigation expenses, a stockholders' derivative suit will
lie to hold the directors personally liable to the corporation. Such
an action lies not under the federal antitrust laws but rather upon
the basis that causing such a violation is a breach of management's
fiduciary duty to the corporation. Personal liability should be restricted, however, to cases where the individuals involved knew,
or because of the per se nature of the violation should have known,
that they were violating the law. The conviction of certain corporate officers in the recent electrical industry conspiracy cases is
perhaps illustrative of this type of violation. When one considers
the possible magnitude of the liability of such officers in a fiduciary
duty action, the potential impact of the fiduciary duty action as it
relates to the federal antitrust laws can readily be appreciated.

William Y. Webb, S.Ed.

